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In this paper we study the asset pricing implications of a parsimonious two-agent
macroeconomic model with two key features: limited participation in the stock mar-
ket and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The parameter
values for the model are taken from the real business cycle literature and are not
calibrated to match any ﬁnancial statistic. Yet, with a risk aversion of two, the
model is able to explain a large number of asset pricing phenomena including all
the facts matched by the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
Examples in this list include a high equity premium and a low risk-free rate; a
counter-cyclical risk premium, volatility and Sharpe ratio; predictable stock returns
with coeﬃcients and R2 values of long-horizon regressions matching their empirical
counterparts, among others. In addition the model generates a risk-free rate with
low volatility (5.7 percent annually) and with high persistence. We also show that
the similarity of our results to those from an external habit model is not a coinci-
dence: the model has a reduced form representation which is extremely similar to
Campbell and Cochrane’s framework for asset pricing.H o w e v e r ,t h emacroeconomic
implications o ft h et w om o d e l sa r ev e r yd i ﬀerent, favoring the limited participation
model. Moreover, we show that policy analysis yields dramatically diﬀerent conclu-
sions in each framework.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
No other puzzle in the last two decades has probably generated as much interest and subsequent
research as the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). These authors essentially
showed that the historical equity premium (i.e., the excess return of stocks over bonds) was
puzzling in the context of the canonical general equilibrium portfolio-choice model, which is also
the foundation of most neoclassical macroeconomic analysis. The long quest for a resolution
has uncovered further puzzling facts such as the risk-free rate puzzle of Weil (1989), adding
to the list of challenges. After many extensions and enrichments of the basic framework, a
satisfactory explanation still seemed elusive.1
Building on the earlier insight of Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) a number of recent
papers have introduced models featuring preferences with endogenous habit formation (Jer-
mann 1998; Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher 1999) or “catching-up with Joneses” (Campbell and
Cochrane 1999) which can explain both the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles. In
fact, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) go even further and are able to match a wide variety of
ﬁnancial statistics including the time series and cyclical patterns of asset prices as well as the
predictability of excess returns.
Although habit persistence could be an appealing description of behavior at an introspective
level, it is fair to say that it is probably not the best understood aspect of individual preferences.
At a more concrete level, the empirical evidence seems mixed. Studies using aggregate data
usually ﬁnd evidence in favor of habit2 with quite large persistence (Ferson and Constantinides
1991; Heaton 1995; Daniel and Marshall 1998) whereas individual-level data does not seem to
reveal even the slightest hint of such behavior (Naik and Moore 1996; Dynan 2000; McKen-
zie 2002). Furthermore, Otrok, Ravikumar and Whiteman (2002) show that both the equity
premium and the risk-free rate implied by these models are extremely sensitive to the speciﬁ-
cation of the shock process. For example, even small changes in the persistence of consumption
growth–much more modest than those observed in the U.S. historical data–imply movements
in average returns in the order of 15 to 25 percentage points. Thus it is still useful to study asset
prices in a model with standard preferences (for example, CRRA) but by allowing for other
elements, such as sources of heterogeneity which are observable or empirically well-established.
In this paper we follow this second route and study asset prices in a parsimonious two-agent
macroeconomic model with two key features: limited participation in the stock market and
heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. In other respects the framework
is a standard real business cycle model. More speciﬁcally, we consider an economy with a
neoclassical production technology and competitive markets. There are two types of agents.
The majority of households (ﬁrst type) do not participate in the stock market where claims to
the ﬁrm’s future dividends are traded. However, a risk-free bond is available to all households,
so non-stockholders can also accumulate wealth and smooth consumption intertemporally. We
1For excellent surveys of the literature on these puzzles, see Kocherlakota (1996) and Campbell (1999).
2A number of papers have argued that time aggregation might strongly bias results in favor of habit persistence
even when there is none. See for example Porter and Wheatley (1999) and the references therein.
2also model the capital adjustment costs faced by ﬁrms (as in Lucas and Prescott 1971; Jermann
1998; and Boldrin, et. al 1999). Finally, consistent with empirical evidence which we document
in Section 3, we assume that stockholders have a higher elasticity of substitution than non-
stockholders. With CRRA utility this also implies heterogeneity in risk aversions, but as we
show in the robustness analysis with Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences the results of the paper
remain essentially the same when both agents’ risk aversions are set equal to two, while keeping
the elasticities ﬁxed at their baseline values.
We ﬁnd that the model is surprisingly successful in explaining a large number of asset pricing
phenomena, many of them considered to be puzzles. To provide a benchmark, the model can
match all the facts studied in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) as well as a number of others on
which that model is silent. This is true even though the model has no free parameters, and all
the structural ones are calibrated to standard values from the business cycle literature. This
approach is in contrast to some recent papers on asset pricing where a number of parameters
are chosen speciﬁcally to match certain moments of ﬁnancial variables.
Here is an overview of our results. With a risk aversion of two for both agents, the Sharpe
ratio is 23 percent (and 29 percent with a risk aversion of three) compared to 25 to 30 percent
in the U.S. data. The model also matches the levels of returns as well as their volatilities.
Especially the low variability of the interest rate has proved to be a particularly tough challenge
for habit persistence models–a risk-free rate volatility above 20 percent is common (c.f., Boldrin
et. al. 1999). In contrast, the annual volatility of the interest rate in our model is 5.7 percent
compared to 5.4 percent in the U.S. data. Moreover, the model generates a countercyclical
equity premium, conditional volatility, and Sharpe ratio, all of which are documented features
of asset prices. Furthermore, stock returns are predictable and both the coeﬃcients and the
R2 values of the long-horizon regressions of future stock returns on the price-dividend ratio
match those obtained in the ﬁnance literature (Campbell and Shiller 1988; Fama and French
1989). Finally, the model explains a number of other features of asset prices, such as their
autocorrelation patterns, their cross-correlations with each other, and so on.
These results do not rely on high risk aversion, idiosyncratic shocks or binding borrowing
constraints. Limited participation is the critical element generating all of these results. On
the other hand, preference heterogeneity has a big impact on the ﬁrst two moments of returns,
but is not as critical for other ﬁndings. The driving force behind the time-series results is
the evolution of the wealth distribution over the business cycle. More speciﬁcally, a positive
persistent technology shock increases the value of equity signiﬁcantly beneﬁting the stockholders
immediately. On the other hand non-stockholders gain only gradually as their wages grow with
increasing capital and they respond by accumulating more wealth. Thus, initially the share of
wealth held by stockholders go up coming back down slowly. As a result, each group’s inﬂuence
over the determination of asset prices change endogenously through the business cycle giving
rise to interesting time-series behavior.
Many of these results can also be found in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). They study a
representative-agent exchange economy with a slow-moving external habit term in the utility
function. They reverse-engineer the parameters of this habit process to match a number of
3ﬁnancial moments and ﬁnd that the model performs impressively in other dimensions as well.
The remarkable similarities between our results suggests an interesting possibility: Even though
the two models look very diﬀerent on the surface, could there be a deeper connection between
them? We ﬁnd that this is indeed the case. The limited participation model has a reduced form
which is extremely similar to Campbell and Cochrane’s framework in terms of asset pricing
implications. In particular, the complicated process they recover (and call external habit) turns
out to be just the consumption process of non-stockholders.
A simple way to see this point is by considering the Euler equation for the stockholder in
our model. Let X be non-stockholders’ consumption and CA be aggregate consumption. So,




















a r et h er i s k ya n dr i s k - f r e er a t e s .N o t et h a tas i m i lar Euler equation does not hold for aggregate
consumption. Now, if in fact asset prices are determined by this condition, an observer who
ignores limited participation and takes CA as the right measure of consumption would still have
to subtract X to successfully explain asset prices and then would have to somehow reinterpret
this X. In the case of Campbell and Cochrane (hereafter, C-C), they call it a habit process.
In Section 5 we make this point rigorously and show that the process X a s s u m e di nC - Ch a s
virtually the same statistical properties as non-stockholders’ consumption in our model. In a
way this ﬁnding veriﬁes their conjecture that the representative agent preferences they recover
“could result from aggregation of heterogenous consumers with quite diﬀerent preferences” (p.
241).
What do we learn from these results for studying macroeconomic problems? This question
is critical since an important reason for macroeconomists’ interest in ﬁnancial anomalies is
because these puzzles challenge the foundations of the very framework used for policy analysis.
I tw o u l db eh a r dt op l a c eal o to fc o n ﬁdence in the quantity implications of a framework which
has notoriously poor pricing implications. Unfortunately, the extension of the external habit
model to study macroeconomic issues has not been all that successful. For example, Lettau
and Uhlig (2000) show that incorporating external habit results in a number of macroeconomic
anomalies in an otherwise standard business cycle model. One has to introduce a number of
frictions in production and more habits in leisure and so on, in order to partly counteract this
eﬀect.
Fortunately, this is where the similarities between our model and the habit framework ends.
The macroeconomic implications of the limited participation model are as good as a standard
business cycle model without any adjustment costs and are still in the right ball park with the
frictions imposed. The main source of diﬀerence between the two models leading to these results
is the extremely high risk aversion (around 80) assumed in C-C compared to a risk aversion of
4only two used in our framework.3 Finally, the model generates substantial wealth inequality
together with a more even consumption distribution both of which match the empirical statistics
from the U.S. data. We study the macroeconomic implications of this model in more detail in a
companion paper (Guvenen 2002) and show that it can also help resolve some macroeconomic
puzzles.
In section 7, we conduct a simple policy experiment (a capital income taxation problem)
and ﬁnd that the two models yield drastically diﬀerent policy conclusions. This point suggests
extreme caution as the success of habit persistence models encouraged many researchers to
address policy questions in that framework (among others, McCallum and Nelson 1998; Fuhrer
2000; Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 2001; and Abel 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the parametrization
is discussed in Section 3. We then analyze asset prices in Section 4 and establish the connection
between the two models in Section 5. Starting with Section 6 we look at macroeconomic
behavior where the similarities end. Section 6 analyzes the positive implication and Section 7
presents a normative perspective in the context of a capital income taxation problem. Section
8 contains sensitivity analysis and relates the paper to the existing literature, and Section 9
concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is an extension of the framework studied in Guvenen (2000). For transparency of
results, our modeling goal is to stay as close to the standard real business cycle model (e.g.,
Hansen 1985) as possible and only introduce two key features: limited participation in the
stock market and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We consider an
economy populated by two types of agents who live forever. The population is constant and is
normalized to unity. Let λ (0 < λ < 1) denote the measure of the ﬁrst type of agents (who will
be called “stockholders” later) in total population.
Preferences










for i = h, n, where the superscripts h and n denote stockholders and non-stockholders respec-
tively, and β is the subjective discount rate. As for the parameterization of the momentary
utility function, we have two considerations in mind. On the one hand, we want to keep pref-
erences standard to highlight the eﬀect of limited participation and other endogenous features
3Although endogenous habit models imply a low risk aversion they still result in a very low EIS which is the
driving force for macroeconomic models. In our model, capital is controlled by stockholders who have a high EIS
(at least 0.5) with our calibration.
5of the model. This suggests a standard CRRA utility function: u(C)=C1−α
1−α and we adopt it
throughout much of the paper. On the other hand, it is well-known that with this speciﬁcation
the parameter α controls both the relative risk aversion (RRA) and the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution (EIS) which are diﬀerent aspects of individuals’ tastes. To clarify the intuition
of the results in Section 8 we will generalize the preferences to the recursive utility function of
Epstein and Zin (1989). This exercise will also allow us to discuss which features of the results
are driven by the risk aversion versus the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
The Firm
There is a single aggregate ﬁrm producing the consumption good using capital (Kt) and




where θ ∈ (0,1) is the factor share parameter. The logarithm of the stochastic technology level

























subject to the technology constraint which features adjustment costs in investment







t is the ex-dividend value of the ﬁrm in a given period, and βj Λt+j
Λt is the discount
rate (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between periods t and t + j). The adjustment cost
function Φ(·) is concave in investment which captures the diﬃculty of quickly changing the
level of capital installed in the ﬁrm. Consequently, the prices of capital and consumption goods
are not equal and Tobin’s q is not necessarily equal to unity. This speciﬁc a t i o ni st h es a m ea s
the one used in Jermann (1998) and Boldrin, et. al (1999) to make comparison easier.
The ﬁrm is 100 percent equity ﬁnanced as commonly assumed in the real business cycle
literature. It is relatively straightforward to introduce leverage into this framework (say, as a
ﬁxed proportion of capital) although we will not pursue that approach here. A share in this
4To save on notation (but at the expense of slightly abusing notation) we use Kt to denote the ﬁrm’s capital
choice and we will also use the same variable to denote aggregate capital which the ﬁr mt a k e sa sg i v e nw h e n
making its choice. In equilibrium, of course, the two are the same.
6ﬁrm entitles its owner to the entire stream of future dividends given by
Dt = ZtKθ
t L1−θ
t − WtLt − It.
The ﬁrm does not issue new shares and ﬁnances investment through retained earnings. For
convenience we normalize the number of shares outstanding to unity so that PS
t is also the












Finally, the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions together with competitive labor markets imply that
workers are paid their marginal products: Wt =( 1− θ)Zt (Kt/Lt)
θ .
Stockholders and Non-stockholders
Both agents have one unit of time endowment in each period, which they supply inelastically
to the ﬁrm. Besides the productive capital asset there is also a one-period riskless household
bond (in zero net supply) that is traded in this economy. The crucial diﬀerence between the
two groups is in their investment opportunity sets: “Non-stockholders” can freely trade in
the bond, but as their name suggests, they are restricted from participating in the capital
market. “Stockholders,” on the other hand, have access to both markets and hence are the sole
capital owners in the economy. Following the incomplete markets literature we impose portfolio
constraints as a convenient way to prevent Ponzi schemes. As we discuss in the quantitative
analysis these constraints can be quite loose and actually they never bind in our simulations.
The timing of events is as follows: each period starts with production; agents are paid
their wages and asset returns are realized after production takes place. Then consumption and
portfolio choice decisions are made and asset trading is carried out. Finally, consumption takes
place and the period ends. Before we move to agents’ problem a ﬁn a lr e m a r ki si no r d e r .
Remark: It is possible to think of the participation structure assumed here as an endogenous
outcome of a model where there is a one-time ﬁxed cost of participating. With a cost of
appropriate magnitude, type 1 agents (with low risk aversion) will enter the stock market
whereas the other group will stay out. The resulting equilibrium is identical to the one studied
here; see Guvenen (2002) for a further discussion about endogenizing participation. We feel that
for the purposes of the current paper this is a reasonable assumption and our main conclusion
is not likely to be overturned by this extension.
Individuals’ Dynamic Problem and the Equilibrium
In order to state the individual’s problem recursively, we need to specify the aggregate state-
space for this economy. The Markov characteristic of the exogenous driving force naturally
suggests concentrating on equilibria which are dynamically simple. Thus, the portfolio holdings
of each group together with the exogenous technology shock constitute a suﬃcient state space
which summarizes all the relevant information for the equilibrium functions.
In a given period, the portfolios of each group can be expressed as functions of the beginning-
of-period capital stock, K, the aggregate bond holdings of non-stockholders after production,
7B, and the technology level, Z. Let us denote the ﬁnancial wealth of an agent in the current
period by ω where we suppress superscripts for clarity of notation. The dynamic programming
problem of a stockholder can be expressed as follows:










c + PB (K,B,Z) ∗ b0 + PS (K,B,Z) ∗ s0 ≤ ω + W (K,Z)







K0 = ΓK (K,B,Z)




where the expectation is conditional on the set Ω containing all the information at the time of
decision, and b0 and s0 denote bond and stock holdings respectively. The endogenous functions
ΓK and ΓB denote the laws of motion for aggregate wealth distribution which are determined in
equilibrium; PB denotes the equilibrium bond pricing function. Note that each agent is facing a
constraint on bond holdings with possibly diﬀerent (and negative) lower bounds. The problem
of the non-stockholder can be written as above with s0 ≡ 0.
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by a pair of value
functions V i ¡
ωi;K,B,Z
¢








, stock and bond pricing functions,
PS (K,B,Z) and PB (K,B,Z), a competitive wage function, W (K,Z), an investment function
for the ﬁrm, I (K,B,Z), and laws of motion for aggregate capital and aggregate bond holdings
of non-stockholders, ΓK (K,B,Z), ΓB (K,B,Z), such that:
1) Given the pricing functions and the laws of motion, the value functions and decision rules
of each agent solve that agent’s dynamic problem
2) Given the equilibrium discount rate process
Λt+j
Λt and W (K,Z), the investment function
I (K,B,Z) and labor choice are optimal.
3) Bond market clears: λbh ¡
$h;K,B,Z
¢
+( 1− λ)bn ($n;K,B,Z)=0 , where $i denote
the aggregate wealth of a given group; and the labor market clears: L = λ∗1+(1− λ)∗1=1 .
4) Aggregates result from individual behavior:






Bt+1 =( 1 − λ)bn ($n,K t,B t,Z t). (4)
5) There exists an invariant probability measure P deﬁned over the ergodic set of equilibrium
distributions.
83 Quantitative Analysis
Since an analytical solution is not possible, we use numerical methods to solve for the equilib-
rium. The task is quite challenging requiring solutions to three dynamic programs (one for each
agent plus one for the ﬁrm) where each program depends on the solution of other problems in
quite a nonlinear way. For example, the ﬁrm takes the discount factor (stockholders’ MRS) as
given where in fact that MRS is obtained from the solution to the stockholder’s problem who
in turn takes the investment decision and stock prices as given. The crucial step is the ﬁrst one:
to get good initial guesses for equilibrium laws of motion and especially for pricing functions.
We relegate the discussion of these and other computational issues (as well as the accuracy of
the solution) to the Appendix.
Baseline Parameterization
A currently common method for calibrating asset pricing models is to choose a number
of parameters to match certain ﬁnancial statistics, such as the risk-free rate and the equity
premium (as in Jermann 1998, and Boldrin, et. al. 1999), the persistence of the price-dividend
ratio (Campbell and Cochrane 1999) and so on. Then additional moments of the data serve
as overidentifying restrictions to be examined. In contrast, we follow the real business cycle
tradition and calibrate the parameters to replicate the long-run macroeconomic facts of the
U.S. economy such as the average capital-output ratio, the persistence of the Solow residuals
and so on. In particular, no parameter is chosen to replicate a ﬁnancial statistic.
The time period in the model corresponds to 3 months of calendar time. The capital share
of output, θ, is set equal to 0.4 following Cooley and Prescott (1995). As for the technology
shock, we match the persistence of the Solow residual, ρ =0 .95, and set the standard deviation
of the innovation equal to 2 percent. Although this latter number is larger than the one reported
in Cooley and Prescott (1995), it is consistent with the estimates obtained by Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), and the values used in Danthine and Donaldson (2001), and Storesletten,
Telmer and Yaron (1999) among others. Moreover, we will compare the model to data extending
back to 1890, and given that output and consumption were substantially more volatile prior to
World War II, this seems like a sensible choice. We use a 12-state Markov chain to discretize
the AR(1) process for Zt following Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method. As Table 11 in the
Appendix shows, the autocorrelation structure (from lag 1 to 5) of the approximation tracks
the AR(1) process quite closely, and the standard deviation is equal to the true value.
To complete the description of technology, we choose the adjustment cost parameter, ξ =
0.23, which is the value used in a number of recent papers (Jermann 1998, Boldrin et. al
1999, Francis and Ramey 2002). This value is near the low end of the empirical estimates for
this variable (the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s q), so we will also conduct
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.
Participation rates: The stock market participation rate has gradually increased from
around 5 percent in the 1950s to approximately 19 percent in 1982 (Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances). During 1990s, for many reasons ranging from the emergence of mutual funds and
reduced costs of (on-line) trading to the retirement saving by baby-boomers, this trend has
9accelerated in the U.S. as in the rest of the world. As a result, in 1999 the stockholding rate
has reached almost 50 percent.5 Since in this paper we are studying a stationary economy, we
want to focus on the pre-1990s U.S. economy. Moreover, a signiﬁcant fraction of households
are holding very small amounts of stocks. For example, in the 1984 PSID data, 24 percent of
households declare themselves as stock owners whereas the fraction holding more than $10,000
worth of stocks is less than 10 percent (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991). A diﬀerent way to put this is
that more than 95 percent of all stocks is held by the top 10 percent stock owners. (This is true
even in 1998 SCF data, after the participation boom of the ’90s). Thus, in the baseline case the
fraction of stockholders, λ, is set equal to 20 percent. We will also report results for λ =3 0 % ,
which is close to the average raw participation rate in the 1980s. The main conclusion we will
draw is that it does not aﬀect the main message of the paper (Section 8).
Borrowing constraints are harder to measure and calibrate. We want to choose these bounds
to reﬂect the fact that stockholders can potentially accumulate capital which can then be used
as collateral for borrowing in the risk-free asset, whereas non-stockholders have to pay all their
debt through future wages. For the baseline case, we allow stockholders to borrow in bonds up
to twelve quarters of expected labor income (Bh = 12 ∗ E (W)). As for non-stockholders, we
calibrate their borrowing limit to two quarters of expected income, which is twice the credit
limit most short-term creditors, such as credit card companies, impose. Again, these constraints
do not bind in our simulations and can be relaxed without aﬀecting any of the main results.
Preference Parameters
T h es u b j e c t i v ed i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,β, is set equal to 0.99 in order to match the U.S. capital-
output ratio of 3.3 reported by Cooley and Prescott (1995). We calibrate the curvature param-
eter α based on the implied elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is a large body of
evidence documenting signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the EIS across population (Blundell, Brown-
ing and Meghir 1994; Attanasio and Browning 1995; Atkeson and Ogaki 1996; Barsky, Juster,
Kimball and Shapiro 1997; Attanasio, Banks and Tanner 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen 2002).6 Fur-
thermore, using individual level data, these studies ﬁnd that stockholders (or the wealthy in
general) have signiﬁcantly higher elasticity of substitution than the poor. To capture these
diﬀerences in a parsimonious way we set αh =2and αn =1 0which is close to values obtained
by Attanasio et. al. Note that although with the CRRA utility adopted in our baseline model
these values also give rise to heterogeneity in the risk aversion, for none of our results this
heterogeneity plays an essential role. In Section 8, we disentangle the two parameters using
Epstein-Zin preferences and show that with the same EIS values used here, if we set both agents’
risk aversion parameters to two, the results of the paper remain intact. What matters for the
results is mainly the risk aversion of stockholders and the EIS of non-stockholders. Table 1
summarizes our baseline parameterization.
5In terms of wealth-weighted participation rates, participation boom is less pronounced because old stockhold-
ers still own most of all the equity outstanding (the “Equity Ownership in America” report by the Investment
Company Institute 1999).
6See Browning, Hansen and Heckman (1999) and Guvenen (2002) for detailed descriptions of this evidence
and discussions of the importance of heterogeneity in the EIS in various contexts.
10Table 1: Baseline Parametrization
Quarterly Model
Parameter Value
β Time discount rate 0.99
αh Risk aversion of stockholders 2
αn Risk aversion of non-stockholders 10
λ Participation rate 0.2
ρ Persistence of aggregate shock 0.95
σε Standard deviation of shock 0.02
θ Capital share 0.4
ξ Adjustment cost coeﬃcient 0.23
δ Depreciation rate 0.02
Bh Borrowing limit of stockholders 12W
Bn Borrowing limit non-stockholders 2W
Note: The baseline model assumes CRRA utility function for both agents implying that the respec-
tive elasticities of intertemporal substitution are 0.5 and 0.1 for stockholders and non-stockholders
respectively. The borrowing limits are indexed to the average wage rate, W.
4 Results: Asset Prices
In this section we study the asset pricing implications of our model. We will look at a large
number of pricing phenomena that have received attention in the literature.
We start with the ﬁrst two moments of the stock and bond return. Table 2 displays the
statistics from the simulated model along with their empirical counterparts from the U.S. his-
torical return data taken from Campbell (1999). The “long sample” corresponds to the period
1890−1991, and the “post-war period” covers 1947−1991. When calculating the stock return
in the post-war data there is one point worth mentioning. In a recent paper McGrattan and
Prescott (2001) convincingly argue that approximately 1.8 percent of yearly stock returns from
1960 onward can be attributed entirely to favorable changes in the tax code (and speciﬁcally to
the reduction of dividend and corporate income taxes). Since the model here abstracts from all
taxes we subtract 1.8 percent from stock returns each year after 1960. With this adjustment
the equity premium is roughly 5 percent per year in both sample periods.
Comparing the model to the data, we ﬁrst see that the average risk-free rate exactly matches
empirical values. Second, the stock return is 5.3 percent compared to 7 percent in the data and
consequently the equity premium in the model is around 3.3 percent, which is approximately
2/3 of the historical value. Although, by slightly increasing the risk aversion of stockholders
(from two to three), the equity premium rises to 4.9 percent and the Sharpe ratio to 0.29
without any pronounced side eﬀects (column 4), we will not pursue this strategy here. The
reason is that the risky return in the model corresponds to the stock of a ﬁrm which is entirely
equity ﬁnanced (hence unlevered) unlike the empirical counterpart which measures the return
11Table 2: Moments of Asset Prices and Returns
US Data Model RBC
Long Sample Post-War αh =2 αh =3








18.21 6 .71 4 .11 6 .70 .37
E(Rf)1 .91 1.68 1.98 1.63 4.16
σ(Rf)5 .44 2.23 5.73 6.51 0.18
E(RS − Rf) 4.82 5.36 3.32 4.90 .004
σ(RS − Rf)1 9 .11 6 .81 4 .71 7 .10 .27
E(RS−Rf)
σ(RS−Rf) 0.25 0.32 0.23 0.29 .014
ρ(RS,R f) −0.04 0.02 −0.01 0.02 0.97
Panel B: The Stock Price and Dividend
σ (d)1 3 .31 3 .61 1 .21 0 .6 —
p − d 21.12 4 .72 3 .22 3 .8 —
σ(p − d)2 7 .02 6 .21 5 .61 9 .6 —
Notes: The mean and standard deviation of each variable is annualized and reported in percentages.
The data is from Campbell (1999) and covers 1890-1991. Long sample covers the entire period and
post-war data is from 1947 to 1991. Following McGrattan and Prescott (2001) we subtract 1.8
percent per year from stock returns after 1960 to adjust for tax changes as described in the text.
to U.S. ﬁrms which have signiﬁcant debt in their capital structures.7 The eﬀects of leverage in
production economies are well understood: it raises both the level and the volatility of the stock
return (see Benninga and Protopapadakis 1991, and Cecchetti, Lam and Mark 1993). Thus, it
does not seem reasonable to try hard to match the risky rate in the current framework otherwise
introducing debt into the capital structure would cause us to overshoot the risk premium.8 Of
course one interesting question is: How does the model generate a large equity premium with
standard preferences and low risk aversion? The mechanism here is quite diﬀerent compared
to a representative agent model and we defer that discussion to the end of this subsection.
Second, the volatility of the risky rate is around 14 percent which is slightly lower than in
the data (17 − 18 percent). This small discrepancy is again consistent with the fact that there
is no leverage in the model. Also in the data the risky rate and the equity premium have very
similar variabilities (18.2 versus 19.1) which is captured well by the model (14.1 versus 14.7).




t ) ≈ 0.0 in the long sample as well as in our simulations. For comparison the two
returns have a correlation of 0.97 in the standard RBC model. We also report the corresponding
statistics for the standard RBC model in the last column, but since the shortcomings of that
7Jermann (1998) reports from Masulis (1988) that the debt-to-value ratio varies between 0.13 to 0.44 for
market values and between 0.53 to 0.75 for book values.
8In principal it is very easy to incorporate leverage into our model. However, the computational demand of
the current version is already extremely high. So we postpone that exercise for now.
12Table 3: Volatility of the Risk-Free Rate In Various Models
US Data This Paper Boldrin Jermann Campbell-
Long Sample et. al. Cochrane
β — 0.99 0.99999 0.99 0.97
E(Rf) % 1.91 1.98 1.20∗ 0.82∗ 0.94∗
σ(Rf) % 5.44 5.73 24.61 1 .46 0.0∗
Notes: A “*” indicates that some parameters in that particular model were chosen to match the
statistic. The volatility statistic from Boldrin et. al is the result in their baseline model (preferred
two-sector). In Jermann (1998) the ﬁgure is from the baseline case with stationary shocks; the
volatility is 11.98 percent with random walk shocks.
framework are quite well-known we do not comment on them here (see Rouwenhurst, 1995).
Now we return to the risk-free rate. As noted above, the risk-free rate is low with a reasonable
(and quite standard) discount rate of 0.99. But arguably the more interesting feature is the low
volatility of the interest rate that has proved quite a challenge even for recent models which have
been quite successful otherwise (Table 3). For example, in Boldrin et. al (1999) the variability
ranges from 17.4 percent all the way up to 25.4 percent and in fact the risk-free asset is more
volatile than the stock in all speciﬁcations they consider (except when they introduce leverage
in which case the risky rate goes up to 25 percent). Cognizant of this fact C-C chose the
functional form and the free parameters for the law of motion of the exogenous habit process
judiciously to generate a constant risk-free rate.
In contrast, and to our pleasant surprise, the limited participation model yields the same
volatility for the bond return as in the U.S. data without any degrees of freedom to choose. This
outcome will appear even more surprising later when we further document many similarities
between the asset pricing implications of this model and the habit persistence framework. So,
what explains the diﬀerence?
To clearly see the diﬀerence consider the bond market diagram in Figure 1. The left panel
depicts the case of a representative agent with habit formation in consumption. Even though
external and endogenous habit diﬀer in the risk aversion they imply, both speciﬁcations result
in very low EIS and hence in a very inelastic bond demand curve. The interaction of this
steep demand curve with the bond supply which is also perfectly inelastic at zero (due to the
representative agent assumption) means that even small shocks to demand will generate large
movements in the bond price and hence a substantial volatility of the risk-free rate.9 On the
other hand, in our framework the explanation is quite simple (right panel) . First, note that
just like the representative agent above, the majority of the population (non-stockholders) have
very inelastic bond demand. The crucial diﬀerence is that the bond supply is not inelastic at all.
In fact, stockholders’ supply schedule is quite ﬂat both because of their preferences (EIS ≥ 0.5)
9Campbell and Cochrane observe this problem and ingeniously (but also in an ad-hoc manner) specify the
habit process such that shocks to this demand function exactly cancel out and the bond price never moves.
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Figure 1: Determination of Bond Price Volatility in A Representative Agent Model (Left) versus
in the Limited Participation Model (Right)
and also because they have another asset to substitute. A movement in the bond demand of
similar magnitude now results only in small changes in the interest rate and the rest will be
reﬂected in the variability of trade volume in the bond market.10 The existence of shocks to
stockholders does not overturn this result. This explanation also captures the fact that unlike
in representative agent models people do actually trade in bond markets even though the total
supply may be zero and it seems that heterogeneity among participants is an important factor
determining asset prices.
We now move from returns to prices. The lower panel in Table 2 displays the moments
of the stock price and the dividend process. First, the volatility of the dividend process is
around 11 percent in the model which is quite close to what is in the data. Second, the average
price-dividend ratio in the model is around 23, in line with the empirical evidence. The P/D
ratio however seems a little too smooth (but higher when αh =3 ) which could increase once
leverage is introduced into the capital structure.
How Does the Model Generate a Large Risk Premium?
Saito (1995) studied a model with limited participation where both agents consume out of
wealth. He showed that the equity premium is linearly increasing in the share of wealth owned by
non-stockholders. A large premium is then possible if stockholders borrow a signiﬁcant fraction
of the capital invested from non-stockholders. This is basically a leverage story: high borrowing
makes stockholders’ portfolio risky and they demand a high premium to hold stocks. Given that
there is no labor income and non-stockholders constitute a large fraction of the population this
10The terms demand and supply are rather arbitrary here since both groups do demand bonds depending
on the interest rate. We denote −b
h as the bond supply of stockholders for convenience and because they are
actually net borrowers in equilibrium.
14outcome happens naturally, potentially yielding a high equity premium. However, in the long-
run non-stockholders’ share of wealth goes to zero (in a growing economy without labor income)
and so does the premium. Furthermore, in reality even though U.S. ﬁrms have signiﬁcant
leverage ratios, a large fraction of this debt is in fact held by other stockholders (either as
corporate bonds or other non-equity ﬁnancial assets). An arguably better measure is to look at
the fraction of productive capital owned by stockholders (capital in publicly traded companies
plus private businesses) as a fraction of the total. By this measure stockholders own more than
90 percent of all ﬁnancial assets and private capital which means that total borrowing cannot
be more than 10 percent of aggregate capital (Poterba and Samwick 1995). This amount is too
small to yield any signiﬁcant risk premium.
As we demonstrate in Section 5 when we analyze the macroeconomic implications, stockhold-
ers in fact hold 90 percent of wealth in our economy too. So there must be another mechanism
generating the risk premium. What happens here is that both agents face signiﬁcant risks in
their labor income which is also persistent given the AR(1) nature of the shock. This feature
is absent in Saito (1995) and creates more demand for precautionary wealth in our model.
Non-stockholders can do that only through holding bonds which is possible when stockholders
borrow. But note that stockholders can also smooth shocks ex-post by saving and dissaving the
capital. This is an option not available to non-stockholders. Further exacerbating the situation
for this poor group is the fact that they have very low EIS and thus they desperately want to
insure (a feature absent in Saito 1995, and Basak and Cuoco 1998). This asymmetry in market
incompleteness coupled with heterogeneity in preferences results in stockholders only trading if
non-stockholders pay a high premium. The high premium in turn depresses the risk-free rate
which means accumulating wealth does not pay oﬀ for non-stockholders and they end up with
low wealth in equilibrium. In other words, the fact that the observed borrowing of stockholders
is not high does not mean that non-stockholders do not demand wealth. They desperately do
but their very demand lowers the return they face in turn lowering their wealth holdings.
This explanation also highlights an important diﬀerence of this framework from a model with
hand-to-mouth consumers, advocated for example by Campbell and Mankiw (1989). Since non-
stockholders hold only a tiny fraction of capital in the U.S. economy (as well as in our model),
it is sometimes suggested that these households behave as if they consume their income period
by period. However, such a modeling would miss the important interaction in the bond market
described above and eliminate the main mechanism which gives rise to the equity premium.
The Effect of Adjustment Costs
The mechanism just described for the equity premium more precisely determines the price
of risk, or in other words, the premium for each unit of the risk. Thus the level of the premium
is also determined by the volatility of the return. In a frictionless production economy this
volatility is very low with the small size of the aggregate shock. Introducing adjustment costs
is one way to reduce the elasticity of capital supply and increase the volatility of returns and
as a result the level of the equity premium. However, adjustment costs have little eﬀect on the
Sharpe ratio which is displayed in Table 4. The Sharpe ratio goes from 24 percent down to 22
percent when we move essentially from an exchange economy (ξ =0 .01) to the frictionless limit
15Table 4: Sharpe Ratio for Different Values of the Adjustment Cost Parameter
Adjustment Cost Parameter (ξ)
0.01 0.10 0.23 0.5 ∞
Sharpe Ratio 0.238 0.234 0.229 0.223 0.216
The reported Sharpe ratios are from a version of the baseline model with a two point approximation
to the AR(1) process (due to computation time) where the standard deviation is adjusted to keep
the same unconditional standard deviation of Z.
when the cost is completely eliminated. Furthermore, the other asset pricing results studied
below are not sensitive to the adjustment cost: even setting ξ =2 , which is quite higher than
empirical estimates has no appreciable eﬀect.
Finally, we should also stress that we use adjustment costs as a simple way to introduce a
friction into the technology and also to make our results comparable to recent papers which
employed the same speciﬁcation. However, this particular type of friction is not an essential
part of the model. Alternative ways to increase the volatility of return such as stochastic
depreciation (as in Storesletten et. al 1999) could also generate a high level of risk premium.
4.1 Cyclical Properties of Returns
Even a few years ago explaining the ﬁrst two moments of returns would probably be enough
to declare success. However, the hugely successful paper by Campbell and Cochrane raised the
bar higher. We will thus examine the implications of the model in a number of dimensions that
have received attention both in the ﬁnance and macroeconomic literatures.
A large literature in ﬁnance has documented the predictability of stock returns, and in
particular, the fact that many of the variables predicting the returns also predict the business
cycle (Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988; Fama and French, 1989, among
others). Most of these studies focus on the predictive power of such variables as the dividend-
price ratio, the default spread or the term premium which also closely track business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, Fama and French (1989) documented the long term co-movement
between the D/P ratio and business conditions that extend well beyond the duration of a typical
business cycle. They state:
The major movements in these variables (D/P ratio and default premium) and
in the expected return components they track, seem to be related to longer term
business episodes that span several measured business cycles. The dividend yield
and the default spread forecast high returns when conditions are persistently weak
and low returns when conditions are persistently strong.
Figure 2 plots the D/P ratio together with the NBER business cycle dates. The long-run
co-movement is striking. The D/P ratio is high during the 1930s and the early years of World
War II, and is persistently low from 1955 to 1973, a period of stronger economic conditions that





























Figure 2: Co-movement Between the Dividend/Price Ratio and Business Conditions
nevertheless includes four recessions, and increases after the oil shock of 1973 and remains high
until mid-80s.
To further substantiate this claim Fama and French (1989) regress future risky returns on
the D/P ratio and the term premium where each variable captures the long- and short-term
co-movement with output respectively and ﬁnd both of them to be signiﬁcant. Moreover each
variable increases the R2 of the regression when added separately.
In order to test whether the model can capture the twists and turns of the relationship
between ﬁnancial variables and business conditions we conduct the following exercises. We ﬁrst
investigate if the model can account for the cyclical movement of asset prices including the
countercyclicality of the expected equity premium, the conditional volatility and the Sharpe
ratio documented in the literature (see Schwert 1989, Nelson 1991, and Chou, Engle and Kane
1992). Moreover, in the next subsection we also replicate the long-horizon regressions of ex-
pected returns on the D/P ratio of Campbell and Shiller (1988).











from the equilibrium functions exactly (rather than having to regress the return data
on variables predicting business conditions) and examine their co-movements with aggregate
output directly. First, in order to separate high frequency ﬂuctuations typically associated with
business cycles from longer term movements we follow the RBC tradition and ﬁlter output using
aH o d r i c k - P r e s c o t tﬁlter. We then document the co-movement both in the short-run and in the
long-run as stressed by Fama and French. Table 5 presents the relevant statistics.
Column 1 shows that besides the long-term positive co-movement with output depicted in
Figure 2, the price-dividend ratio is also pro-cyclical at business cycle frequencies. Both of these
correlations are captured by the model. Second, an interesting observation is that the realized
17Table 5: Cross-Correlation of Financial Variables with Output
US Data Model
Variable Short Long Short Long


























t ) c-cycl c-cycl −0.34 −0.51
Notes: All statistics are annual from the long sample covering 1890-1991. The columns with
headings Short and Long report the correlation with output at business cycle frequencies and in
the long-run respectively. The notation p-cycl and c-cycl denote pro- and counter-cyclical.
equity premium is procyclical even though ex ante excess returns are strongly countercyclical
suggesting that innovations to returns and output move in the same direction. This feature is
also true in the model: the correlation of realized excess returns from the model is equal to its
empirical counterpart (0.30), even though the expected return is countercyclical (−0.31).
As for the conditional volatility of returns, there are two well-documented facts. One,
conditional volatility is countercyclical in the U.S., which is also true in our model both in
the long-run (−0.47) and at business cycle frequencies (−0.28). Two, conditional volatility is
highly persistent and thus clusters over time. This feature is clearly seen in our model as well:







is 0.85. Moreover, peeking ahead to
Table 8 (bottom of Panel A) we see that absolute stock returns are positively autocorrelated
just like in the data, which again is another indication of persistence in variability.
The countercyclical variation in volatility would seem to provide a justiﬁcation for the
countercyclical movement in the risk premium. After all, the premium can be expressed as
the product of the price of risk (
Et(RS−Rf)





movement in the latter will give rise to a change in the risk premium even if the former is
constant. However, empirical evidence does not seem to back up this argument. Expected
returns move a lot more than conditional volatility, and hence the price of risk (Sharpe ratio)
is also countercyclical (Chou, Engle and Kane 1992). The same pattern emerges in simulated
data both in the long-run (−0.51) and in the short-run (−0.34).
This result is due to the signiﬁcant countercyclical redistribution of wealth away from stock-
holders which makes them eﬀectively more risk averse in recessions because of the concavity of
the value function (as a result of precautionary motives). On the other hand, the change in
non-stockholders’ wealth is much more modest. As a result, the bond price jointly determined
by both groups is not aﬀected as much creating countercyclical movement in the price of risk.




∆d included? No No Yes No No No No Yes
Horizon Coeﬀ. R2 R2 Coeﬀ. R2 Coeﬀ. R2 R2
1 −0.08 .06 .06 −0.10 .11 −0.12 .12 .12
3 −0.16 .12 .13 −0.18 .31 −0.20 .33 .33
5 −0.25 .21 .22 −0.33 .51 −0.28 .41 .41
7 −0.34 .27 .28 −0.44 .57 −0.36 .48 .48
10 −0.36 .39 .39 −0.64 .73 −0.41 .53 .53
Notes: The data is from Campbell (1999) and covers 1890-1991. The coeﬃcients for the regression
when ∆d are very similar to those with dividends left out and hence are not reported.
4.2 Predictability of Returns: Long Horizon Regressions
The previous section documented the fact that expected returns are correlated with the busi-
ness conditions and hence are predictable in our model. Although these cyclical patterns are
interesting they do not tell us directly t h es i z eo ft h ep r e d i c t a b l ec o m p o n e n tin stocks. The
long-horizon regressions of Campbell-Shiller, and Fama-French provide a more direct answer.
Furthermore, because many of the conditional moments cannot be easily calculated from data,
these regressions form the basis of most empirical evidence. Thus we replicate these regressions
in our framework which also serve as a more direct comparison of the model to existing evidence.
We ﬁrst regress stock returns on the price/dividend ratio for the long sample and post-
war U.S. data (Table 6). The classic pattern documented in the literature can seen here:
the coeﬃcients are negative indicating that a high P/D ratio forecasts lower returns in the
future. Moreover both the coeﬃcients and the R2 values are increasing with horizon and reach
impressive levels.
The model counterpart is reported in the last three columns. Both the coeﬃcient estimates
and the R2 values are strikingly similar to the empirical results: predictability is modest at one
year horizon but increases steadily and reaches 50 percent at 10 year horizon. The coeﬃcients
also increase quickly ﬁrst and then grow more slowly. Another interesting ﬁnding by Campbell
and Shiller is also presented in column 3. Basically, lagged dividend growth has almost no
predictive power once the P/D ratio is included in the regression. The R2 values remain
virtually unchanged and the coeﬃcients (not reported) are not signiﬁcant. The same result is
replicated in simulated data where the R2 values do not change up to the third digit and the
coeﬃcients are mostly insigniﬁcant even with a simulated sample size of 15,000 years.
An alternative manifestation of return predictability is the excess volatility of stock prices.
As i m p l ew a yt os e et h i si sb yﬁrst decomposing the variance of the log P/D ratio following
19Table 7: Variance of Price-Dividend Ratio Explained by Future Covariances
Variance U.S. Data Model
explained by Long Sample Post-War
rS
t+j 101 137 124
∆dt+j −10 −31 −27
Notes: Each cell reports the percentage of variance explained by the corresponding variable (that
is,
³P∞
j=1 γjcov (pt − dt,x t+j)
´
/var(pt − dt) where x is ∆d and −rS in each case). The
formula is calculated using 15 lags (years) both in the data and in the model.












at the steady state, we have:
var(pt − dt) ≈
∞ X
j=1








In the U.S. data (Table 7) a substantial fraction of total volatility is accounted for by the
covariance of the log P/D ratio with future returns and only a small component is explained by
varying expectations of future dividend growth. Moreover, both autocovariances are negative,
consistent with the idea that a high P/D ratio signals low dividend growth which in turn means
low returns in the future. The model captures both aspects of the data, and the covariances
fall between the values observed in the post-war data and in the long-sample.
4.3 Time Series Properties: Autocorrelation and Cross-correlation
The autocorrelation structure of ﬁnancial variables display some very interesting patterns. For
example, although the risk-free rate is highly persistent, the risky rate (as well as the equity
premium) has no signiﬁcant persistence and displays mild mean reversion. On the other hand,
the absolute value of the risky rate is positively autocorrelated both at short and long-horizon
indicating clustering of volatility. Finally, as noted earlier the dividend yield (D/P) is also
extremely persistent and its ﬂuctuations extend well beyond the duration of typical business
cycle episodes.
In the standard RBC model many variables have time-series behavior very similar to that of
the exogenous technology shock. This is not totally surprising given that the assumed functional
forms with little curvature together with a single source of uncertainty ties most variables tightly
to the properties of the shock. In this sense the variety of autocorrelation patterns observed in
ﬁnancial data might seem too rich to be explained with our model which is based on the same
framework.
The model turns out to be surprisingly successful in explaining the time series of ﬁnancial
data. For example, as reported in Table 8, the autocorrelation structure of the P/D ratio
matches that in the data all the way from 1-year to 10-year horizon. C-C view this persistence as





US Data .79 .59 .52 .35 .32 .23
Model .80 .64 .52 .35 .23 .18
rs − rf
US Data .03 −.22 .08 −.14 .10 .12
Model −.02 −.04 .01 −.01 −.01 −.02
rs
US Data −.02 −.17 .10 −.11 .08 .09
Model −.12 −.07 −.05 −.03 −.02 −.03
rf
US Data (R∗) .53 .36 .23 .14 .15 .10
US Data (N∗) .83 .73 .69 .60 .57 .43
Model .84 .66 .52 .34 .22 .11
|rs|
US Data .13 .09 .06 .14 .15 .07




US Data −.12 .02 −.06 −.10 −.05 −.04
Model −.16 −.13 −.10 −.07 −.04 −.03
Notes: The empirical statistics are calculated for the period 1890-1991. The rows denoted by R∗
and N∗ report the correlation for real and nominal interest rates respectively.
key for their results and they calibrate one of the free parameters to match this autocorrelation
structure. In contrast, here the model delivers this result as a natural outcome.
Second, the model generates weak mean reversion in the equity premium similar to that in
the data. The autocorrelation is very small and tends to revert to its mean. The sum of the ﬁrst
k autocorrelations of excess returns (for k =1 ,..,10) is also small and negative in the U.S. data
and is also tracked quite well by the model (not reported). For comparison, in the RBC model
the ﬁrst autocorrelations of the risky rate and excess return are 0.63 and 0.55 respectively and
are still above 0.30 at 10 year horizon
Third, since the risk-free rate is time-varying in our model we can examine its time series
behavior, a feature absent from C-C’s framework. The interest rate is highly persistent in the
model. Measuring the empirical counterpart is a little tricky because in reality bonds are only
nominally riskless since they have inﬂation risk.11 Using the ex-post real rate is one possible
11One could potentially look at index bonds to get a measure of the real interest rate. Index bonds however are
very new in the US, and they have been traded in the UK since 1982. Also these bonds have an indexation lag
21approach (the row denoted by R∗) but due to unanticipated inﬂation, the autocorrelation
structure calculated this way is downward biased. An alternative option is to use the ex-ante
nominal return which is probably a better indicator of the risk-free rate investors anticipate (the
row denoted with an N∗). This series is signiﬁcantly more persistent. The truth probably lies
somewhere in between and so does the risk-free rate in the model. The persistence is the same
as that of the nominal rate for short horizons and falls to levels closer to the autocorrelation of
real interest rates at longer horizons (for 5 to 10 years).
Finally, the model also generates the correct pattern of volatility clustering and predictabil-
ity: absolute returns are positively autocorrelated consistent with the U.S. data implying that
high volatility is usually followed by more volatility. This evidence complements the high per-
sistence revealed in the conditional standard deviation (ρ(σt,σt+1)=0 .85) reported earlier.
Furthermore, as shown in the lower panel, a low P/D ratio predicts higher volatility in the fu-
ture and both the sign and size of the autocorrelation structure are similar to empirical values.
This is the leverage eﬀect documented by Schwert (1989) and Nelson (1991) among others.
Correlation of Consumption Growth with Asset Returns
One interesting observation about the linkage between asset prices and quantities is that
the market return seems to do a better job in explaining asset returns than does consumption
growth. An alternative statement of this fact is that the static CAPM outperforms consumption-
based asset pricing models. C-C show that when consumption is aggregated over time before
calculating the growth rate, the same relation holds in their model as well which is surprising
since the true data generating process for asset prices is the consumption-based model.
At this point, may be not too surprisingly, this result holds in our model too. The correlation
of the true discount factor (M) with the growth rate of time-aggregated consumption falls very
quickly (Table 9). On the other hand the risky rate has a substantially higher correlation of
0.96 with M even when aggregated over 12 periods. For example, if we simulated our model
at a monthly frequency, aggregating variables to yearly data would make it look as if the risky
rate is a much better proxy for the true discount factor compared to consumption growth.
Moreover, although Campbell and Cochrane attribute this outcome to the existence of habit,





is correctly constructed from stockholders’
consumption and by construction there is no habit, which suggests that this outcome is a result
of time aggregation.
Overall, we believe that these results demonstrate the potential of the limited participation
model as a parsimonious framework for conducting serious asset pricing analysis.
5 Habit versus Limited Participation: What is the Connection?
In the previous section we showed that a macroeconomic model with limited participation
a n dh e t e r o g e n e i t yi nt h eE I Si sa b l et oe x p l a in a large number of asset pricing phenomena
of 8 months which means they are essentially nominal at shorter horizons. Thus with few data points at annual
frequency it is not clear how useful that data will be for our purposes and we do not pursue that approach here.















Notes: Consumption growth is aggregated up by adding each period’s consumption as it is done
with actual data.
including all the results presented in C-C.12 The similarities between the two models’ results
are remarkable. Although the current framework arguably has further advantages (such as the
time-varying and realistic interest rate) the similarities are still many.
One curious question that comes to mind is whether the similarities are just a coincidence or
whether there might be a deeper connection between the two frameworks. On the surface though
the two models look quite diﬀerent (e.g., representative- versus heterogeneous-agents; external
habit versus standard CRRA utility; exchange versus production economy; random walk versus
autoregressive shocks, to name a few). Nevertheless, we will show that our model has a reduced
form representation which looks strikingly similar to the external habit formulation of C-C
including their parameterization of free parameters!



















Note that this condition only holds for stockholders, and not for aggregate consumption.
Making the substitution, Ch = CA −X, where CA denotes aggregate consumption, and letting


















This is the same Euler equation that C-C derive once Xt+1 is reinterpreted as an external
12There are a few results discussed in Campbell-Cochrane (such as the correlation of consumption growth with
returns, the actual time series of stock price data generated by the model, etc.) that we have not reported here
to save space. They are all as similar to C-C’s ﬁndings as the ones reported. Available upon request.
23habit term. In other words, because some households do not participate in the stock market
and satisfy their Euler equations (with respect to stocks), representative agent models ignoring
this fact would still have to subtract their consumption (Xt+1) from the aggregate (CA
t+1) to
successfully explain asset prices. Thus ignoring limited participation would make it look as
if the representative agent was displaying habit persistence. Of course for this claim to have
any validity, we have to establish that the properties of Xt a r ev e r ym u c ht h es a m ea st h e






, which is the key ﬁgure in their model and the properties of this ratio drives all
the action. In that framework St is the consumption above habit as a percentage of total,





, is simply the share of
















































This alternative expression also holds in both frameworks, and can be viewed as adding
an extra state variable, St, to the standard Euler equation of Mehra and Prescott (1985). For
either model to have any hope of success St m u s tb ed o i n gs o m e t h i n gm a g i c a l .S t r e s s i n gt h i s
critical role C-C introduce a fairly elaborate exogenous process for st ≡ log(St): 13






and calibrate it to match a number of ﬁnancial moments. Apart from the persistence term φ,
the nonlinear sensitivity function, λ(st), is chosen to satisfy three conditions viewed desirable
for matching asset prices (more on this later). As C-C acknowledge, this is a reverse engineering
exercise as it is diﬃcult to justify the speciﬁc functional form and the parameter values chosen
for λ(st) on economic grounds.
So how similar are the two models really? In the analysis below we look at the statistical
properties of St as well as the features of λ(st) assumed in C-C and the one implied by our model.
The ﬁrst obvious step is to check whether St in our model is procyclical which is, a priori, not at
all clear. In the habit model the surplus ratio increases in good times because habit evolves very
slowly and lags behind actual consumption, so this ratio has a strong positive correlation with
output. Similarly, in our model St (stockholders’ share of consumption) has a correlation of 0.92
with output. This correlation is driven by two separate eﬀects. First, stockholders have a higher
13We set the growth rate of consumption (g) in their formulation equal to zero since we are looking at a
stationary model.
24EIS so their consumption rise more in response to a positive shock. And second, a technology
shock increases the stock price and thus stockholders’ wealth substantially on impact, whereas
the immediate eﬀect for non-stockholders is much weaker because their savings increase only
gradually as their wage grow slowly with capital.
After passing this ﬁrst test of sensibility we can now proceed to take a closer look. First,
we compare the densities of St which are displayed in Figure 3. The one in the right panel is
obtained by simulating the AR(1) process above with the parameter choices in C-C. As can be
seen, its mode is at its upper bound and the distribution has signiﬁcant negative skewness. In
the left panel we plot the unconditional density of
¡
Ch/CA¢
in our model. To us, the similarity
looks just remarkable, especially considering that
¡
Ch/CA¢
is an endogenous outcome and does
n o th a v ea n yo ft h ea b o v es p e c i ﬁcations or free parameters.14 The two distributions almost
have the same shape including the location of the mode, the sharp upper bound and the left
tail.15 Moreover, the left skew in the ratio is despite the fact that neither Ch nor CA have
signiﬁcant skewness16 and the two are highly correlated at business cycle frequencies.
Second, turning to conditional information one can get an even clearer picture. C-C calibrate
the persistence parameter φ above to match the autocorrelation structure of the price/dividend
ratio. Their parameter choice implies a quarterly persistence of 0.96 for St which is virtually
the same as the autocorrelation of
¡
Ch/CA¢
in our model: 0.954! This could be expected at
some level since our model was able to match the autocorrelation of the P/D ratio without
calibrating any extra parameters.
Third, as C-C emphasize the functional form of λ(st) is at the heart of their model. Es-
pecially the fact that the sensitivity is decreasing in St so that habit is more sensitive to
consumption shocks when it is already low is credited for generating many of the results. By







AR(1) process above we can back out the implied sensitivity function from our model which we
call b λ(st).
Figure 4 plots both λ and b λ on the same graph. The cloud of points representing b λ are
downward sloping and almost parallel to λ as if it was shifted down. However, recall that the
two functions could not possibly be identical since one of the three requirements C-C had in
mind when choosing λ was to get a constant risk-free rate. One can relax this assumption
following the approach in the working paper version of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and





0 + B (st − s), (5)





is due to the Markov approximation. Even
though the 12-state process is able to match the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the AR(1), it is still
truncated at both ends. When we reduce the persistence of the AR(1) process we get very similar distributions






15Note that in C-C’s benchmark the interest rate is assumed to be constant. If this restriction is relaxed (as
in equation 5 in the main text ) and the interest rate volatility is calibrated to 6 percent per year the density for
λ becomes slightly less skewed and looks even more similar to that in the limited participation model.
16The skewness coeﬃcients are -0.07 and -0.01 for C
h and C
A respectively, but it is -0.43 for C
h/C
A.
25Figure 3: Comparing Empirical Distributions: Stockholders’ share in Aggregate Consumption
(Left) Versus the Surplus Consumption Ratio in Campbell-Cochrane (Right)
where B is again a free parameter. This modiﬁes some of the equations in C-C and in particular
implies a higher steady state surplus ratio which at the baseline case was lower than the average
value in our model. This modiﬁcation scales λ down by
q
1−φ
1−φ−B/2 with C-C’s calibration. By
choosing B such that the risk-free rate has roughly 1.5 percent quarterly standard deviation as
in our model, the implied B =0 .039 and the scaling factor is 1.78. The adjusted λ function
now falls almost on top of the one estimated in our model!
Finally, we can compare the models in yet another dimension by looking at the implied habit
process Xt itself. When choosing the λ function, C-C discuss three desirable properties that
Xt should satisfy. First, it is a smoothly evolving process and in particular σ2
C À σ2
X. Second,
C>Xeverywhere so that the power utility function is well-deﬁned. Third, around the steady
state Xt is predetermined and moves positively with consumption elsewhere. This essentially
implies that locally C and X are uncorrelated and globally they have a positive correlation.
All three of these conditions are naturally satisﬁed by non-stockholders’ consumption (Xt)






≈ 4 − 5) even though 80 percent of the population are non-stockholders
(more on this in the next section). Second, CA >Xis satisﬁed naturally since stockholder’s
consumption has to be positive. And third, the two group’s consumption has a relatively low
correlation (0.72) implying that CA and X have a positive but less than perfect correlation.
Given that asset prices in both models are determined by the Euler equation above, the
striking similarities between St (and Xt) largely explains how the two models’ implications
are virtually identical conﬁrming our conjecture that the external habit speciﬁcation can be
viewed as a reduced form representation of the limited participation model. The endogenous re-
distribution of wealth between the two groups with diﬀerent utility curvatures is reﬂected in a
time-varying risk aversion in the representative agent framework with external habit. However,


























Limited Participation Model 
Figure 4: Comparison of the sensitivity function λ(st) assumed in Campbell-Cochrane to the
one implied by the Limited Participation model
as we demonstrate in the next two sections these similarities do not extend to macroeconomic
implications or to policy analysis conducted in the two frameworks.
Before concluding this section we want to show how our reinterpretation of external habit
preferences eliminates an unattractive feature of C-C’s model: an incredibly high risk aversion.
To see this note that the utility function used by C-C is u =
(C−X)1−α
1−α a n dw i t ht h er e p r e s e n -
tative agent assumption they interpret C as the actual consumption of the agent and X as an
externality. When calculating risk aversion one would then diﬀerentiate all expressions with
















where the second equality is obtained by using the envelope condition, uc = Vω, and then
substituting for uc. With C-C’s parameter choice α
St is approximately 40 at steady state and
grows without bound as Ct falls near Xt during a recession. Moreover, ∂ lnCt
∂ lnWt is greater than 1
resulting in an average risk aversion of 80, and in hundreds during recessions.
In the context of our model, however, if one correctly interprets Xt as non-stockholders’


















∂ lnωt is just 1 with CRRA utility in the absence of borrowing constraints (and is only
slightly above 1 in our model since stockholders are far from their constraints) which implies
RRAt ≈ α =2with C-C’s calibration independent of Xt! However, this is not to say that the
diﬀerence between the two models is just a matter of interpretation as will become clear in the
macroeconomic analysis below.
6 Results: Macroeconomics
The interest of macroeconomists in the equity premium puzzle (despite being primarily an asset
pricing phenomenon) is not all that surprising. Mehra and Prescott (1985) essentially showed
that the historical excess return was puzzling in the context of a standard general equilibrium
(consumption-portfolio choice) model which is also the foundation of most neoclassical macroe-
conomic analysis.17 Naturally, one would wonder, how much conﬁdence can be placed in a
framework which has grossly counterfactual implications for most pricing problems? Thus it is
compelling, from macroeconomists perspective, to examine if a model proposed to resolve these
asset pricing puzzles also displays plausible macroeconomic behavior.
Despite the enormous success of the Campbell and Cochrane model in explaining asset
prices, its extension to study macroeconomic problems has not been as impressive. Lettau and
Uhlig (2000) embedded the external habit speciﬁcation used by C-C in a standard real business
cycle model and found that it creates a number of macroeconomic anomalies. For example,
consumption turns out to be extremely smooth: the quarterly standard deviation is a mere
0.02 percent which is 70 times smaller than observed in the U.S. data. Introducing another
habit formation, one in leisure, does not help much but instead gives rise to other puzzles of
its own: labor hours become too smooth and countercyclical. Overall, they concluded that
“introducing habit formation in consumption and leisure yields counterfactual cyclical behavior
in an otherwise standard real business cycle model.”18
It is then natural to ask if the successful asset pricing results of the limited participation
framework also come at the cost of unrealistic macroeconomic behavior. In Guvenen (2002) we
analyze the quantity implications of this model (without adjustment costs) in detail and ﬁnd
that it not only delivers plausible statistics, but it also helps us understand some facts which
17Although Mehra and Prescott used an exchange economy version of the canonical model, further extensions
to include production, more general preferences, as well as many other elements to enrich the model did not alter
the conclusion appreciably until the introduction of habit persistence models discussed here.
18Boldrin et. al (1998) tackle this problem by imposing restrictions on the production side of the economy such
as immobility of labor and/or capital between sectors, another assumption which forces agents to make savings
decisions before they observe the aggregate shocks and so on. Also, the EIS is not as low in their framework as
in C-C.
28Table 10: Macroeconomic Statistics — Time Series and Cross-Section
US Data Model
Post-War ξ = ∞ ξ =0 .23 ξ =0 .5
Panel A: Time Series








— 1.8 4.4 3.6
σ (Cn) — 1.0 1.1 1.0
σ (I) 8.2 8.6 3.0 5.3
P a n e lB :C r o s s - S e c t i o n a l
ωh/ωA 88% 85% 89% 86%
Ch/CA 32% 34% 37% 35%
Notes: The statistics reported in panel A are from quarterly U.S. data covering 1947.1-1991.4.
Standard deviations are calculated from data after the trend is removed with a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter from the log of raw data with a bandwidth parameter of 1600. The investment ﬁgure includes
changes in inventories; if excluded the volatility is 5.8 percent. The source for the distribution of
ﬁnancial wealth is Wolﬀ (2000), and for consumption data is Guvenen (2002).
appear puzzling in a standard RBC model.19 Thus in this section we present a brief overview
of the macroeconomic results of the model both with and without adjustment costs imposed.
Table 10 displays a summary of both aggregate business cycle and cross-sectional statistics.
First, we start with the case when ξ = ∞ (no adjustment costs) which is more directly
comparable to Lettau and Uhlig’s analysis. In contrast to their ﬁndings, here the volatilities
of output, aggregate consumption and investment are all quite close to their empirical values.
Note that this is true even though most households have a very low elasticity of substitution.
If these households were holding a signiﬁcant fraction of wealth (which is not the case; see
panel B), their preference for very smooth consumption would induce them to save and dissave
vigorously in response to shocks causing aggregate investment and thus output to be overly
volatile. Instead, virtually all the wealth is held by households with a high EIS, so both output
and investment have more plausible variabilities.
Second, when adjustment costs are imposed, with our baseline calibration (ξ =0 .23) output
remains fairly unchanged, but the volatility of aggregate consumption goes up. When we
decompose consumption across the two groups, it becomes clear that the increase is mainly due
to stockholders. One possible way to reconcile this ﬁnding with empirical evidence is to observe
that stockholding is very unequal even among stockholders. For example, in 1998, almost 95
percent of all equity (including pensions) was held by the top 10 percent of the population, but
19An example of such a puzzle is the apparent inconsistency between econometric studies using aggregate data
which estimate a very low EIS parameter (Hall 1988, Campbell and Mankiw 1989) and calibrated models which
ﬁnd a high EIS to be more consistent with the same aggregate data. The limited participation model is consistent
with the ﬁndings of both literatures, a results largely due to the realistic heterogeneity created by the model.
29even more remarkably, the top 1 percent of households owned 48 percent of all equity (Survey
of Consumer Finances, 1998). Since consumption is much more evenly distributed than wealth
in the U.S. (panel B), even if these wealthy stockholders have very volatile consumption paths,
their eﬀect in aggregate consumption is likely to be quite modest.20 In other words, the two-
agent framework attributes a lot of variability to the consumption of all stockholders whereas
in reality most of the aggregate risk is borne by a much smaller fraction within this group.
Nevertheless, the model still predicts the average consumption volatility of stockholders to
be higher than that of non-stockholders. There is considerable evidence that this is indeed
the case. For example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that the variance of stockholders’
consumption growth is more than twice that of non-stockholders. This is true even though their
consumption measure consists of only food expenditures from PSID. Furthermore, Attanasio,
Banks and Tanner (2002) use non-durables and services as their consumption measure from
the Family Expenditure Survey on British households and calculate stockholders’ consumption
growth variance to be four times larger than non-stockholders’. In a recent paper, Aït-Sahalia,
Parker and Yogo (2001) focus on the sales of luxury goods as a measure of the wealthy’s
consumption.21 They ﬁnd for example that the annual standard deviation of the sales of luxury
retailers is between 17 to 23 percent, and the volatility of charitable contributions is 21 percent.
Although there is certainly some durability in these expenditures, these numbers are even
much larger than the standard deviation of durable consumption expenditures which is around
8 percent annually in the post-war NIPA data. Again, comparing between durable goods, the
sales of Porsche cars have an annual volatility of 34.3 percent compared to 8.5 percent for
overall luxury cars (deﬁned as having a price higher than $24,000). Hence, although indirect,
this evidence also seems to suggest that the wealthy (and similarly the stockholders) have more
volatile consumption paths than non-stockholders consistent with the model.
Finally, the baseline parameter choice for adjustment costs (ξ =0 .23) which we take from
previous studies (Jermann 1998 and Boldrin et. al 1999) is on the low side of empirical estimates.
If one sets ξ =0 .5 then, as shown in column 4, both consumption and investment come closer
to empirical values. The only noticeable change in ﬁnancial statistics is a small reduction in
the level of the premium without aﬀecting the Sharpe ratio (Table 4) or any other asset pricing
questions investigated before. As we discussed before the level of the premium can be increased
by leverage or a slightly higher risk aversion. Alternatively, adjustment costs may not be the
most appealing and realistic friction to consider. Irreversibilities in the investment decision,
stochastic depreciation of capital or frictions in inter-sectoral movements of capital are other
realistic features of the production process which can also generate high return volatility.
Turning to the cross-section, the model reveals an interesting pattern of heterogeneity: in the
baseline case, stockholders consume only 37 percent of aggregate consumption despite holding
89 percent of aggregate wealth. Interestingly, this is exactly the same kind of distribution
observed in the U.S. data. This result is intuitive since consumption is proportional to income
20See Poterba (2000) for an elaboration of this point.
21Of course the link from sales to the consumption of a certain group is clearly not a direct one, but the
evidence should still be informative.
30in the long-run which is more evenly distributed than wealth. If one interprets the relevant
empirical measure as ﬁnancial wealth (since we have no housing or durables in the model) then
the share of wealth held by the top 20 percent is approximately 90 percent (Poterba 2000). This
result is also robust to adjustment costs and holds even in the limit when capital is perfectly
elastic (Panel A). In this sense, limited participation does not only have successful asset pricing
implications but also gives rise to plausible macroeconomic aggregates and heterogeneity.
Putting all this evidence together it is clear that the similarities between the two models do
not extend to macroeconomic analysis. Both models have implications not captured by the Euler
equation for portfolio choice. In particular, in the limited participation model, although non-
stockholders do not hold a lot of wealth they contribute substantially to aggregate consumption
and aﬀect its properties.
7H o w D i ﬀerent Are The Two Models?: A Policy Experiment
The recent success of habit formation models (both endogenous and external variety) has en-
couraged researchers to perform policy analysis in these frameworks. For example, Fuhrer
(2000) documents this success and proceeds to conduct monetary policy analysis in an endoge-
nous habit model. In a similar framework, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) analyze
optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy. On the ﬁscal policy side, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) and
Abel (2001) study optimal taxation in environments with external habit (For other examples,
see also McCallum and Nelson 1998, D’Amato and Laubach 2002, Levin and Williams 2002). In
this section we conduct a simple policy experiment to demonstrate that one can reach dramati-
cally diﬀerent conclusions in the limited participation model compared to the habit persistence
model.
The experiment we have in mind is the capital income taxation problem which has been
widely studied in the literature. It has long been recognized that the welfare eﬀects of this tax
critically depend on the degree of intertemporal substitution (Summers 1981, King and Rebelo
1990). Indeed, Hall (1988) concludes that his estimate of a small average EIS also imply a
weak response of savings to changes in interest rates. To the contrary, we argue that the eﬀect
of taxation on savings will be determined by the wealth-weighted elasticity measure, which is,
given the enormous wealth inequality, very close to that of the stockholders.
In order to demonstrate our point, we study a simple tax reform problem similar to the one
studied by Lucas (1990). We imagine that initially the government imposes a ﬂat-rate tax on
capital income and returns the proceeds to households in a lump-sum fashion. Suppose that,
at a certain date, capital income tax is completely eliminated and agents have not previously
anticipated it. We set the initial tax rate τk =3 6percent which roughly corresponds to the
average rate in the U.S. All aspects of the baseline model remain intact. Also, in order to make
our results comparable to the previous literature, we ﬁrst consider the welfare gain from this
reform in a representative agent framework. If the agent has ρ =0 .5,t h ew e l f a r eb e n e ﬁto f
this policy is 0.75 percent of consumption per period taking the transition path into account.
Although it may not seem much, as Lucas argues, this is an order of magnitude larger than the
31gain from eliminating the business cycle ﬂuctuations, and almost twice the gain from eliminating
a1 0p e r c e n ti n ﬂation. If, on the other hand, we assume ρ =0 .02, (which is higher than the
EIS implied by C-C’s model) the welfare gain is reduced to 0.2 percent of consumption instead,
mainly because now the transition takes approximately 250 years compared to 20 years in the
former case.
Now we subject our two-agent economy to the same tax experiment. The welfare gain is
0.71 percent of total consumption.22 In eﬀect, this economy behaves as if it was populated
only by agents with unit elasticity and non-stockholders’ preferences virtually vanished from
the problem.
There is an even more interesting side to this problem that transpires from explicitly mod-
eling heterogeneity: based on policy experiments like the one above, many economists have
argued in favor of eliminating capital income taxes. But, a representative agent framework is
silent on the question of “who is actually gaining from this reform?” since all agents are assumed
to be identical. In reality, all agents are not identical, and as we have shown so far, in some
dimensions, they diﬀer substantially. So, we would like to take this question seriously and break
down the gains from this reform. It turns out that, in consumption terms, stockholders gain
by 4.7 percent, whereas non-stockholders, who constitute 70 percent of the population, actually
lose 1.9 percent of their consumption! Clearly, this is a diﬀerent conclusion than what comes
out from the representative agent economy. Moreover, if there is an exogenous government
expenditure stream that needs to be ﬁnanced eliminating capital income tax can be viewed as
imposing a consumption tax instead. Hence, it is possible to interpret this result as suggesting
that consumption taxes must be progressive from an equity point of view.
In sum, both kinds of habit persistence imply a low EIS for the representative agent, when
in fact almost all productive capital is owned by households with a high elasticity. Thus,
any policy question which depend on intertemporal substitution is likely to give substantially
diﬀerent answers in each framework.
8 Robustness and Relation to the Literature
[To be Written] Summary:
1. What happens when borrowing constraints are relaxed? The equity premium, its volatility
and the Sharpe ratio remain virtually unchanged. Other statistics studied in this paper
are not aﬀected either qualitatively and quantitatively. The only curious ﬁnding is that
the countercyclicality results are slightly weaker when borrowing constraints are tighter.
2. What happens when risk aversion and EIS are disentangled? Equity premium is deter-
mined mainly by the risk aversion of stockholders and the elasticity of the non-stockholders.
More precisely, when the two are disentangled using Epstein-Zin preferences and the risk
22This calculation is based on the assumption that there is a utilitarian government which tries to attain the
same social welfare index as without taxes and makes transfers to agents in such a way to minimize the total
amount of transfers.
32aversion of both agents are kept at 2, but non-stockholders’ EIS is set equal to 0.1, the
results are virtually identical to what is presented in the paper.
3. What happens when participation rate, λ, i sa s s u m e dt ob e3 0p e r c e n t ? T h ee q u i t y
premium falls to 2.96 percent (from the baseline of 3.3 percent) and the standard deviation
falls to 13.8 percent. So the change in the Sharpe ratio is quite modest: instead of 23
percent, it falls to 21.5 percent. All other results essentially remain qualitatively the same
with only minor changes quantitatively.
4. When preference heterogeneity is eliminated (both agents have elasticities of 0.5 and risk
aversions of 2), the equity premium falls to 0.8 percent and the volatility falls to 8.9%
reducing the Sharpe ratio also to 9 percent. Most of the other results are not aﬀected:
for example, the conditional excess return, volatility and Sharpe ratio continue to be
countercyclical, stock returns are still predictable (although the R2’s fall by approximately
40 percent). The autocorrelation patterns of variables (Table 8) remain largely unaﬀected.
Thus, preference heterogeneity seems to aﬀect the ﬁrst two moments of the returns (Table
2) with the rest of the results mainly driven by limited participation. However, note that
in this case non-stockholders’ consumption becomes more volatile than stockholders’ and
the share of stockholder’s consumption ceases to be procyclical, breaking the close link
between this model and the external habit model. In that sense preference heterogeneity
is essential for the results overall.
Literature Review
There is a vast and growing literature on the asset pricing puzzles addressed in this paper.
For excellent surveys of this literature see Kocherlakota (1996), and Campbell (1999). This
paper is more closely related to the strand of literature which emphasizes the role of limited
participation starting with Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). Saito (1995), and Basak and Cuoco
(1998) studied general equilibrium models with limited participation in the stock market. Our
environment diﬀers in that we emphasize the role of preference heterogeneity as well as labor
income risk. As discussed in Section 4.1, both of these elements play essential roles in generating
the results in this paper. In a recent paper, Guo (2002) studies an exchange economy model
with limited participation and is able to match some of the ﬁnancial statistics mentioned above.
However, as he also emphasizes, his results also rely on large income shocks to each group
(36 percent per year) as well as frequently binding borrowing constraints (40 percent of the
time). In a related line of research, Abel (2001) and Diamond and Geanakoplos (2001) address
policy questions in economies with limited participation whereas Heaton and Lucas (1999)
investigate the consequence of increasing participation for stock prices. This paper complements
this literature by showing that limited participation together with preference heterogeneity
of plausible form can provide a compelling explanation for a large number of asset pricing
phenomena.
339 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a macroeconomic model with limited stock market participation and
heterogeneity in the EIS parameter. This particular two-agent representation is parsimonious
compared to the traditional (fully) heterogenous-agent frameworks of Aiyagari (1994), Krusell
and Smith (1998), and Storesletten et. al (1999), yet it captures a lot of interesting heterogeneity
absent in representative agent models, which turns out to be crucial for understanding asset
prices. We calibrate the parameters of the model to standard values from the real business
cycle literature and in particular we do not choose them to match any ﬁnancial statistic.
The model is surprisingly successful in accounting for the behavior of ﬁnancial variables.
This includes the level and the volatility of the stock return and the interest rate as well as the
cyclical movement of the price-dividend ratio, the equity premium, its volatility and the Sharpe
ratio. Moreover, stock prices have a large predictable component in the model as documented
by many papers in the literature.
Many of the results explained here are also features of the external habit model of Campbell
and Cochrane (1999). We ﬁnd that this is not a coincidence. The limited participation model
has a reduced form which is extremely similar to the external habit model. By abstracting from
limited participation representative agent models still has to subtract non-stockholders’ share
from aggregate consumption to successfully explain asset prices and then reinterprets it as an
externality faced by the representative agent. One major diﬀerence is that the risk aversion in
our model is just 2 compared to an average value of 80 in the external habit model.
The model also generates plausible macro statistics even when there are no frictions in
production whereas the external habit model is hard to reconcile with aggregate macro data
(Lettau and Uhlig 2000) largely due to the extremely low EIS implied by that model. Further-
more, policy analysis in the two frameworks also yield substantially diﬀerent conclusions. This
point suggests extreme caution as the success of habit persistence models encouraged many
researchers to address policy questions in that framework.
Another lesson that we draw from these results is about the potential dangers of reverse
of engineering. Although reverse engineering can do an impressive job in matching a certain
dimension of data (such as asset prices) this success is in no way a guarantee that the model is
a satisfactory description of any other dimension of interest (such as for policy analysis).
We believe that these results would encourage further research on the reasons behind limited
participation which is not addressed in this paper. Furthermore, given the central role played
by non-participation, another natural question concerns the consequences of the recent trends
in participation observed in most countries for asset prices as well for wealth inequality and
welfare.
AA p p e n d i x [ Incomplete]
The discretization method understates the true persistence of the AR(1) process. So, in order to
get a ﬁrst order autocorrelation of 0.95 we simulate an AR(1) with ρ = 0.96 for 30,000 periods.
34Table 11: Autocorrelation Structure of the Markov Chain Approximation
σ (ε) Autocorrelation at Lag
12345
AR(1) 2.000% .950 .903 .857 .815 .774
Markov 2.009% .950 .902 .856 .814 .772
Approximation
Applying the Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method with 12 state points we obtain the desired
transition matrix. Table 11 shows that the generated Markov process behaves almost exactly
like an AR(1) process with ρ =0 .95.
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